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Summary
The runway surface condition at airports is a critical safety concern. The exploratory study
described in this paper has examined the influence of wet and contaminated runways on the
take-off and landing performance of aircraft.
The operating problems that arise when taking off from or landing on wet or contaminated
runways, are explained in detail. Certification of operations on wet and contaminated runways is
reviewed. Tests conducted by NLR on water covered runways are briefly described.
In order to quantify the degree to which the runway surface condition is associated with the
probability of an accident, both accident and movement data for West-European Airports were
collected from the Air Safety databases of NLR. Accident and movement data were evaluated
for 136 airports. The accident sample comprised 91 overruns and veer-offs. The study concludes
that there is a four-fold increase in the accident risk for aircraft operating on wet and
contaminated runways.
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1 Introduction
The runway surface condition at airports is a critical safety concern. The presence of for
instance snow or water on the runway can have a significant impact on aircraft take-off and
landing performance. The accident involving an Airspeed Ambassador aircraft at Munich in
1958, was probably the first major accident in which runway contamination was listed as the
probable cause. Since then research on runway contamination and its impact on aircraft
performance has been strongly intensified. Refs 1 and 2 are examples of the first studies on the
impact of runway surface conditions on aircraft take-off and landing performance.
Despite the extensive research and numerous publications, accidents in which the runway
surface condition (e.g. wet or contaminated) was a contributing factor still frequently occur.
Illustrating examples are the accidents with a DC-10 at Boston-Logan Airport (1982), USA, a
B-737 at Charlotte Douglas Int. Airport (1987), USA (aircraft overran wet runway and was
destroyed), a fatal accident with an A320 which overran the end of the wet runway at Okecie
Airport (1993), Poland (aircraft destroyed), with an MD-80 which hydroplaned off the runway
at Barajas Airport (1996), Spain (nose undercarriage collapsed) and recently a B727 which
veered off the runway during the landing roll on an ice covered runway at Hamilton, Canada
(1997).
The objective of this study is to present an overview of the operating problems and certification
procedures, and to quantify the degree to which the runway surface condition is associated with
the probability of an accident.
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2 Runway surface conditions and their impact on aircraft performance and
safety
2.1 Description of Runway Surface Conditions
Before describing the impact of the runway surface condition on aircraft performance, the
definitions of the runway surface condition itself must be discussed. A combination of
precipitation fall rate (e.g. rainfall rate), wind, runway surface texture and design (e.g. grooved)
determine the runway surface condition at a particular moment. The following runway surface
conditions definitions are normally used (Based on JAR AMJ 25X1591):
• Dry runway.
• Wet runway (the runway is well soaked but without significant areas of standing water).
• Runway contaminated with water, slush1 or loose snow (more than 25% of runway surface
area covered with more than 3 mm of water, slush or loose snow).
• Runway contaminated with compacted snow.
• Runway contaminated with ice.
The last three runway conditions are defined as contaminated runways in general and also in
this study. It is, however, not always easy to classify an actual runway surface condition
according to the list presented here. For instance the surface condition may vary over the full
length of the runway, e.g. a combination of ice and loose snow could exist or an iced-over
surface may be sanded. Another problem is that the contaminant depth is usually not constant
and varies along the runway.
2.2 Aircraft takeoff and landing performance on wet and contaminated runways
Runways covered with water, slush or loose snow affect both the acceleration and deceleration
capabilities of an aircraft. Wet runways and runways covered with compacted snow or ice only
reduce the deceleration capability. A more detailed explanation of the impact on deceleration
and acceleration will be discussed in the following sections.
2.2.1 Impact on deceleration capabilities
The reduction in deceleration capabilities is caused by the reduced tire-to-ground friction when
the runway is wet or contaminated. This friction force is the most important force in stopping
the aircraft. Figure 1 shows an example of the braking tire-to-ground friction coefficient2 of a
Boeing 737 as function of ground speed for several runway conditions (data from Ref. 3). The
                                                     
1 Snow that has a water content exceeding its freely drained condition such that it takes on fluid properties.
2 Defined as the ratio of the friction force and the normal force acting on the tire. Varies between 0 and 1.
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impact of runway surface condition on the braking capability of the aircraft is clearly illustrated.
The reduced braking results in a longer stopping distance than on a dry runway both during a
rejected take-off and during a landing. The braking capability of tires on wet runways can be
significantly improved by making lateral grooves in the runway surface or by improving the
texture of the runway surface.
2.2.2 Impact on acceleration capabilities
Water, slush and loose snow also affect aircraft acceleration performance due to the generation
of additional drag. Both water and slush increase the rolling drag of a tire due to displacement
of the water/slush. In addition to the displacement drag there is also impingement drag from the
water/slush striking the airframe. The total addition drag caused by the water/slush on the
runway, varies linear with water/slush depth and with the square of the ground speed. Loose
snow increases the rolling drag of a tire due to displacement and compression of the snow. The
impingement drag of loose snow is usually neglected. The drag due to snow compression by the
tire varies linear with snow depth and is not a function of ground speed. The drag due to
displacement of the snow does not vary linear with snow depth but with the square of the depth.
The snow displacement drag of a tire varies (theoretically) with the square of the ground speed.
More theoretical details about loose snow drag on a tire can be found in Ref. 4.
Figure 2 gives an example of the additional tire precipitation drag caused by slush on a BAC 1-
11. The additional drag increases with the square of the ground speed until a maximum value is
reached. At this point the drag decreases with increasing ground speed. The speed at which this
occurs is called the hydroplaning or aquaplaning speed.
Figure 3 gives an example of the additional tire precipitation drag caused by loose snow on a
Boeing 737 aircraft. The different components of the drag (displacement and compression), are
clearly illustrated in this figure.
2.3 Hydroplaning
Figure 2 shows that at a ground speed of approximately 55 m/s (107 kts) the drag starts to
decrease with increasing ground speed. At this speed the tires of the BAC 1-11 are completely
separated from the ground by a film of fluid which results in a reduction of both displacement
and impingement drag. This critical speed is termed the hydroplaning speed. Hydroplaning of
aircraft tires has been analysed extensively (see for an overview Ref. 5). In these studies the
following simple empirical equation for predicting the hydroplaning speed is frequently
mentioned3: VHP p= 9 σ . The tire pressure p is in psi and the hydroplaning speed is in kts. This
                                                     
3 Known as Horne’s equation after Walter B. Horne, a researcher at NASA who proposed it in 1963.
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equation is valid for cross-ply tires moving along a water (specific density σ =1) or slush
(specific density 0.78 < σ < 1) covered runway, in the spin-down condition (take-off). For a
landing aircraft the (spin-up) hydroplaning speed is about 15% lower. Figure 4 shows a
comparison of Horne’s simple equation with measured hydroplaning speeds of a number of
aircraft tires. From this figure it becomes clear that the hydroplaning speed for a radial tire is
about 27% lower than for a cross-ply tire of the same pressure. The difference is likely to be
caused by the different shape of the tire ground contact area (footprint area) of both tire types
(See Ref. 6). Especially the ratio of the tire footprint length and width is important in this
respect. Further research is needed to fully understand the reason(s) for the differences in
hydroplaning speeds.
 At touchdown on flooded and slush-covered runways, wheel spin-up can be delayed due to
hydroplaning. This is a very critical situation because the autobrake system, the antiskid system
and most automatic spoilers systems need wheel speed to be activated. In case of the automatic
spoilers systems this is a safety measure to prevent inadvertent in-flight deployment. The
antiskid system initially needs the wheel speed as reference otherwise skidding and locked
wheels cannot be detected by the system. Most antiskid systems feature locked-wheel protection
upon touchdown, implicating that wheel spin-up must occur before the anti-skid system will
allow any brake pressure to be applied at all. The autobrake system, if installed, also activates
upon wheel spin-up and provides immediate and symmetrical brake application after
touchdown, to a programmable deceleration rate.
 An additional effect of delayed spoiler deployment after touchdown is that wing lift is not
immediately reduced, causing low normal forces on the landing gear and therefore delaying
release of the thrust reverser locks, which are usually actuated by main landing gear strut
compression (flight-ground switches). Recognising the importance of the additional stopping
power of the thrust reversers (which is not affected by runway surface conditions) some aircraft
manufacturers have installed thrust reverse locks that release below 10 feet radio altitude.
Autobrakes, thrust reversers and anti-skid are important means for stopping the aircraft on the
runway. Therefore, it is normally advised to pilots to accomplish firm touchdowns when landing
on wet and water/slush covered runways. This will improve wheel spin-up.
Table 1 gives an overview of typical main gear tire pressures, rotation speeds, and touchdown
speeds for a number of commercial jet and turboprop aircraft. Also included in this table are the
calculated hydroplaning speeds for landing and take-off assuming that the main gear is fitted
with cross-ply tires. Touchdown and rotation speeds are considered to be the highest ground
speeds an aircraft will experience in normal operation. Figure 5 and 6 show that in general,
operational ground speeds during both take-off and landing, will be above the theoretical
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hydroplaning speed. This implies that hydroplaning is likely to occur when operating from
flooded and slush covered runways.
In addition to a reduction in displacement and impingement drag, hydroplaning also reduces the
tire-to-ground friction and can reduce the directional control authority of an aircraft. This makes
the hydroplaning condition a critical safety concern for the aircraft and its passengers.
2.4 Directional control
 One of the worst control situations occurs when there is a crosswind in conjunction with a wet
or contaminated runway. In this situation the available tire-to-ground side force will be less than
on a dry runway which can result in the aircraft weathervaning due to the lateral force on the
vertical stabiliser and drifting sideways towards the runway edge. An example of tire side force
coefficient as function of yaw angle and surface condition is given in Figure 7. The situation
worsens when the wheels are locked. In this case there is no side force on the tires at all.
Because of these reasons the maximum allowable crosswind reduces with decreasing runway
braking capability. Figure 8 gives an example of maximum crosswind versus braking friction
for a Fokker F-28 aircraft. The use of reverse thrust in crosswind conditions on wet and
contaminated runways can aggravate directional control problems during rejected take-off and
landing. Whenever the aircraft is allowed to weathervane into the wind, the reverse thrust force
component perpendicular to the runway centreline adds to the crosswind force component. The
reverse thrust will then pull the aircraft to the downwind side of the runway. The tire cornering
forces are too low to counteract this drift for the existing runway conditions. The only way for
the pilot to overcome this situation is to release the brakes, deselect reverse thrust or even apply
some forward thrust and steer the aircraft back onto the runway centreline before reapplying any
braking force. Needless to say that this manoeuvre will greatly increase the stopping distance on
a contaminated runway.
 Directional control problems can also arise due to frozen ruts of ice on the runway. These ruts
may form furrows that catch the nosewheel and may force the aircraft from the centreline.
2.5 Other safety aspects
Besides affecting acceleration, deceleration and loss of directional control, runway
contamination may also cause power loss due to water/slush spray ingestion, jammed landing
gear doors and wing flaps and slats due to frozen slush or snow and damaged flaps due to
impact of water or slush. Loss of forward visibility may occur during the landing roll-out due to
snow blown forward by reverse thrust.
-10-
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3 Certification Aspects
3.1 Take-off and landing performance on wet and contaminated runways
The world’s two major certification branches, FAA and JAA have different rules for accounting
for wet and contaminated runway conditions. The JAA has aircraft certification and operational
rules accounting for runway surface conditions. FAA employs neither aircraft certification nor
operational rules. The JAA has issued Advisory Material Joint AMJ 25X1591, providing
information, guidelines, recommendations and acceptable means of compliance concerning
take-off and landing on wet and contaminated runways.  This AMJ provides acceptable
analytical means to comply with JAR 25X1591, however, flight testing can also be used for
this. The FAA has published an Advisory Circular AC-91-6A dealing with contaminated
runways. In contrast to AMJ 25X1591, this Advisory Circular does not provide mathematical
methods for calculating the take-off and landing performance on wet and contaminated
runways. In fact it provides only limited information compared to the AMJ 25X1591. In 1986,
the FAA proposed an update of it’s current Advisory Circular AC-91-6A. This update provides
guidelines similar to AMJ 25X1591 but is less detailed. Note that the proposed revision is still
not adopted. Figure 2 presents a comparison of experimental slush drag values and calculated
slush drag according to AMJ 25X1591 for a BAC 1-11 aircraft. The overall comparison
between calculated and measured drag values in this example is good.
The current AMJ 25X1591 still has some shortcomings. For instance, the precipitation drag for
small aircraft (e.g. business jets) appears to be underestimated by the method. Therefore, a
European Commission sponsored project has been commenced in order to remove this
deficiency in the current AMJ 25X1591. Partners in this project are Dassault, Saab and NLR.
For this project, NLR has conducted a series of tests on the Cranfield water pond facility with
its Citation II jet aircraft. Results of these tests indicate that the precipitation drag of the main
gear is highly underestimated by the AMJ 25X1591 method. The difference between calculated
and measured precipitation drag of the main gear is about 50% (See Figure 9). More test results
are presented in Ref. 7. Another shortcoming of the AMJ is that loose snow drag is calculated
using the methods for water and slush, which is incorrect from a physical point of view, since
snow is compressible, and water/slush are not. This is also clearly illustrated in Ref. 8 in which
a comparison between experimental and calculated precipitation drag of loose snow for a Falcon
20 aircraft, shows large differences. Both Saab and NLR have also conducted tests on snow
covered runways. Results of these tests are expected soon.
It is interesting to note that both Boeing and McDonnell Douglas have developed their own
methods to calculate aircraft performance on contaminated runways. These methods are mainly
-11-
NLR-TP-2001-216
based on results from tests conducted with a Convair 880 aircraft (Ref. 9). The results are
presented as advisory material in the aircraft operator's manual.
In general, manufacturers like Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Airbus consider reduced V1 and
reduced screen height (from 35 ft. to 15 ft.) for take-off on wet and contaminated runways.
3.2 JAR-OPS
As from April 1, 1998 the JAR-OPS 1 requirements become effective in the JAA states for large
commercial aircraft and on April 1, 1999 for small commercial aircraft. JAR-OPS prescribes
requirements applicable to the operation of any civil aircraft for the purpose of commercial air
transportation by any operator whose principal place of business is in a JAA Member State.
Basic requirements that specifically require to account for wet and contaminated runways are
stated in the JAR-OPS. General the JAR-OPS states about operations on wet and contaminated
runways that “an operator shall ensure that, for the wet and contaminated runway case,
performance data is determined in accordance with JAR 25X1591 or equivalent acceptable to
the Authority is used”.
3.3 Water/slush ingestion
Another important certification aspect is water/slush ingestion. Both JAA and FAA require that
“The airplane must be designed to prevent water or slush on the runway, taxiway, or other
airport operating surfaces from being directed into the engine or auxiliary power unit air inlet
ducts in hazardous quantities, and the air inlet ducts must be located or protected so as to
minimise the ingestion of foreign matter during takeoff, landing, and taxiing”. Therefore
manufacturers conduct water pond tests to demonstrate compliance with the air induction
requirement (see JAR and FAR 25.1091). Normally this requirement sets limits to the maximum
allowable water or slush depth4. The requirement does not speak of snow ingestion. However,
there are cases known in which snow ingestion caused RTO’s.
3.4 Crosswind take-offs and landings on wet and contaminated runways
As discussed in section 2.4 a landing on a wet or contaminated runway in heavy crosswind can
be a critical safety concern. FAR/JAR 25.237  “Wind velocities”, states the following
requirement for crosswind take-offs and landings: “For landplanes and amphibians, a 90-
degree cross component of wind velocity, demonstrated to be safe for take-off and landing, must
be established for dry runways and must be at least 20 knots or 0.2 VS0, whichever is greater,
except that it need not exceed 25 knots”. The requirement clearly states that only dry runways
have to be considered. The crosswind values for dry runways presented in the aircraft flight
                                                     
4 The maximum water/slush depth usually does not exceed 15 mm.
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manual are the maximum demonstrated in the certification flight test program. Operators
generally treat these crosswind guidelines as limits, however, there is no legal restriction on
exceeding them (Ref. 10). Guidelines for the crosswind values on wet and contaminated
runways are obtained through analytical methods, engineering judgement and simulation
techniques. No test flights are required to establish these crosswind values. Crosswind limits for
wet and contaminated runways are normally lower than the values for dry runways (See Figure
8). Interesting is that Boeing has recently revised its crosswind guidelines (See Ref. 10). For the
B737, B757 and B767 there is no longer a difference between the crosswind values for dry and
wet runways.
-13-
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4 Operational aspects
4.1 Pilot related aspects
 As explained in section 2.2, the runway conditions both affect take-off and landing
performance. A crew intending to take-off from or land on a wet or contaminated runway must
account for these runway conditions. Therefore, the captain needs to have information about the
exact runway conditions at the moment of the take-off or landing. For instance, he needs to
know the extent and nature of the runway contamination and also its depth. With this
information the crew can calculate the required runway length, reduction in V1 and/or maximum
take-off weight before taking off. It is interesting to note that there are differences in practice
throughout the aviation community. For instance, the maximum allowable snow depth for a
take-off, applied by three different operators, was 100 mm (4 in.), 71 mm (2.8 in.) and 61 mm
(2.4 in.) for the same aircraft.
Another important source of information used by pilots (especially when assessing landing
performance), is the runway braking action. For many years, extensive research has been
conducted on runway friction. The establishment of a correlation between friction values
measured using some kind of friction tester and that of an actual aircraft was the main objective
in these studies. An excellent example of such a study is given in Ref. 11. The studies
conducted so far, show that the correlation of the braking friction between test device and an
aircraft, varies from good to a poor correlation. This is caused by the fact that the aircraft’s tire
and operational characteristics (such as tire pressure and ground speed) differs significantly with
the friction testers. It is therefore not surprising that Boeing claims that there is no relation
between friction testers and aircraft performance on wet and contaminated runways (see Ref. 3).
It must be noted that in general the correlation between friction testers and aircraft performance
is very reasonable on snow and ice covered runways. There is also another problem with the use
of friction values obtained from test devices. There appears to be a great deal of confusion
among pilots as to the actual meaning of braking action reports and friction values of testers to
the landing and rejected take-off performance of their aircraft (Ref. 12). The braking action on a
runway can also be based on pilot reports. However, studies have shown that there is no
correlation between pilots reports and actual friction values of a runway (See e.g. Ref. 12 and
13). Intensive research on the subject of runway friction testers is still continuing. One of the
more recent initiatives, is the development of an international friction index for runway friction
devices by an ASTM Task group.
 The directional control problems as mentioned in section 2.4 ask for special pilot training in
slippery runway operations. Contaminated runway take-off procedures may call for fixation of
the nosewheel in the centered position by the pilot-not-flying, lifting the nosewheel out of the
-14-
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precipitation early in the take-off run, and increased vigilance on asymmetric thrust application
and any deviation from the runway centreline (a “low take-off abort threshold”).
4.2 Airport operators related aspects
Airport operators have a major duty to ensure the safety of aircraft operations at their facilities.
Therefore they are responsible for monitoring, reporting and improving the runway surface
conditions of their facility. The ICAO “Airport Services Manual, Part 2: Pavement Surface
Conditions” deals with for instance the requirements for maintaining runway friction, periodic
assessment of runway conditions using friction testers, and removal of contaminates like snow
(See Ref. 14 for more details). In the national Aeronautical Information Publications AIP, an
overview is presented of available runway friction testers, and possible contaminate removal
equipment for each international airport in the state. The equipment necessary for contaminate
removal depends on many factors like airport location, climate and density of take-offs and
landings which are but a few to consider. For more detailed information about airport related
aspects in relation to runway surface condition, the ICAO “Airport Services Manual, Part 2:
Pavement Surface Conditions” is highly recommended.
-15-
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5 Analysis of historical accident data
In order to quantify the relative risk of operations on wet and contaminated runways, historical
accident and movement data were analysed. The following approach was applied:
• identify a sample of take-off and landing accidents, including contributing factors and
circumstances (e.g. runway surface conditions)
• compile airport movement data
• determine probabilities of runway surface condition using historical weather data
5.1 Accident data sources
Searches were conducted in the NLR Air Safety database. Additional data were obtained from
Boeing and ALPA. These sources provided sufficient data to enable compilation of a virtually
complete listing of reported accidents fulfilling the selection criteria presented in section 5.2.
5.2 Accident selection criteria
The following criteria were used in selecting accidents:
• The accidents must be an overrun5 or veer-off6 that occurred during take-off or landing.
• The accidents occurred during the period 1976 through 1995.
• The accidents occurred on an airport that is selected for this study (See section 5.3).
• The accidents involved fixed wing aircraft; turbojet and turboprop aircraft with a maximum
take-off mass equal to or exceeding 5,700 kg.
• The accident flights had the following characteristics: engaged in the transportation of cargo
or passengers, scheduled international and domestic flights. Military, training, and test
flights were excluded.
• Accidents due to sabotage, terrorism, and military action were excluded.
• The accidents must have resulted in at least minor damage to the aircraft and/or minor
injuries.
5.3 Airport movement data
This study was limited to European airports only. The European countries considered are listed
in Table 2. The airport sample employed consists primarily of ICAO Principal International
Airports. The final principal airport sample consists of 134 airports.
                                                     
5 Overrun accident= an accident in which the aircraft could not be stopped on the runway and went beyond the end of the
runway.
6 Veer-off accident= an accident in which the aircraft could not be stopped on the runway and left of the side of the runway edge.
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Movement data were obtained from the NLR aircraft movement database. This database
contains movement data from different sources like annual movement totals per airport from
ICAO and FAA publications, individual IFR flights from Eurocontrol7, and scheduled flight
data from the Official Airline Guide (published by the Reeds Travel Group). The last two
sources are the most detailed since for each individual flight the date, origin (airport),
destination (airport), aircraft type and operator are known. For this study data from the
scheduled flight database were used. This database contains all scheduled passenger and cargo
flights (turboprops and jets), worldwide, from 1976 through 1997. The scheduled flight database
can be joined with airport, aircraft and operator databases that are also part of the NLR
movement database. Comparison with published movement information (e.g. from annual
airport statistics) shows that the database is accurate.
5.4 Weather data
In order to quantify the risks of operating on wet and contaminated runways the total number of
take-offs and landings conducted on wet or contaminated runways must be known. The ideal
situation would be to have for each individual take-off or landing the exact runway conditions at
time of operation. However, such detailed information is not available. There are number of
alternatives to overcome this problem. For instance there are a number of very large databases,
which contain historical weather data for a large number of weather stations (including airports).
There is historical weather data for about 15,000 stations worldwide. For a number of these
stations, average weather data is available on a 3-hourly basis. However, for a particular
weather station this data is not always complete or correct. Data of the weather stations have
been stored on a large number of tapes at NOAA, in the USA. Extensive queries on these tapes
are very time-consuming and thus expensive. Therefore, for this study an alternative approach
was followed. If aircraft movements for a long period are considered (say about ten years),
climate data can be used to accurately estimate the number of take-offs and landings on wet and
contaminated runways. Detailed climate tables for airports worldwide were obtained from the
Federal Climate Complex Asheville in the US. These tables contain data on the percent
frequency of hourly precipitation conditions per month derived from 3 hourly observations for
at least 20 years per weather station. This information can be used as an approximation for the
frequency of the runway being wet or contaminated8. It is realised that this approach assumes
that the proportion of time when the runway is wet or contaminated is equal to the proportion of
time when e.g. rain or snowfall occurs. However, for small number of airports (which encounter
all kinds of weather throughout the year, including heavy snowfall), detailed information on the
runway surface condition was available. Comparison with these data showed that the
                                                     
7 Contains more than 50 million individual IFR flights including military flights, covering a period from 1987-1997.
8 A similar approach is followed in Ref. 15.
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assumption made here represents the actual frequency of occurrence very well (difference less
than ±8%).
For each selected airport the monthly frequency of hourly precipitation conditions was used to
calculate the number of take-offs and landings conducted per month on a wet or contaminated
runway. The total numbers of movements per month for each airport were obtained from the
NLR movement database. From these calculations it followed that 24% of all take-offs and
landings for the airports considered, were conducted on wet or contaminated runways during the
period 1976 through 1995.
The average annual number of take-offs and landings on wet and contaminated runways per
country are listed in Table 2.
5.5 Discussion and results
5.5.1 Univariate analysis
The total accident sample fulfilling the criteria stated in section 5.2 consists of 91 accidents, of
which 68 involved jet aircraft and 23 turboprop aircraft. Of the 91 accidents, 43 were overruns
and 48 veer-offs.
Table 3 presents the distribution of accidents by flight phase and runway condition. It follows
from Table 3 that of all accidents in the sample, 25% occurred during take-off and 75% during
the landing. This compares well with the data in the ALPA worldwide database on overruns and
veer-offs (21% during take-off and 79% during landing). Of the landing accidents, 51%
occurred on a wet or contaminated runway, whereas of the take-off accidents 43% occurred on a
wet or contaminated runway.
In more than 50% of the accidents there was substantial damage or the aircraft was destroyed
(See Table 4). There were only 5 fatal accidents (5.5%), which indicates that a veer-off or
overrun accident is likely to be survivable, probably due to the low impact forces during this
kind of accidents.
All 23 take-off accidents occurred after a rejected take-off (RTO). Of these RTO’s 9 (39%)
were initiated after V1 was passed (See Table 5), with 8 of them on a dry runway. Of the RTO’s
before V1, 8 occurred on a wet or contaminated runway.
-18-
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Of the 29 overruns that occurred during landing, 16 (55%) landed too far on the runway usually
with a speed higher than normal. Of these 16 landing overruns, 12 (75%) occurred on a wet or
contaminated runway.
In 32 of the 48 veer-off accidents in the sample there was a directional control problem. In 32%
of the cases this was accompanied with strong crosswinds. The majority of the veer-offs with
directional control problems in combination with strong crosswinds, was on wet or
contaminated runways (82%).
Of the 33 accidents on a wet or water/slush covered runway, hydroplaning occurred in 24% of
the cases (See Table 6). It should be noted that the occurrence of hydroplaning could not be
determined for 16 accidents (48.5%). This limitation should be considered when interpreting the
results of Table 6.
5.5.2 Bivariate analysis
An estimate of the risk of an accident on a wet or contaminated runway relative to a dry runway
can be obtained through the use of a risk ratio (RR). This risk ratio is given by the following
equation:
RR
a A
n N
=
/
/
Where
a = number of accidents on a wet or contaminated runway
A = number of accidents on a dry runway
n= number of take-offs and landings on a wet or contaminated runway
N = number of take-offs or landings on a dry runway
The magnitude of the risk ratio provides insight into the relative association of the runway
surface condition with the risk of an accident. Note that a positive association does not prove
any causation. A risk ratio of 1 means there is no difference in risk if a runway is
wet/contaminated or not. A risk ratio greater than 1 indicates a higher probability of an accident.
The higher the risk ratio the stronger the risk associated with the runway surface condition
becomes. Since the risk ratio is estimated using a sample, a test must be conducted to show
whether it is statistically significant or not. For this study 2 x 2 contingency tables were used to
analyse this. A 95% confidence level was assumed for all calculations.
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Table 7 presents the findings from the evaluation of the relative association of the runway
surface condition on the risk of an accident. All the risk ratios are significant at the 0.05 level.
Table 7 shows that the risk of an overrun or veer-off of jet and turboprop aircraft during take-off
or landing on a wet or contaminated runway, is 4 times greater than on a dry runway.
The differences in risk ratio’s between jet and turboprop aircraft are not statistically significant.
This is interesting because it is often suggested that jets have a higher risk when operating on
wet and contaminated runways than turboprop aircraft because of their higher operating speeds.
During the landing there is a slightly higher risk ratio than during the take-off for both the jet
and turboprop aircraft combined as for the jet aircraft alone. Table 7 suggests that for turboprop
aircraft alone the risk ratio is much higher in the take-off than in the landing. However, this is
probably caused by the limited sample of 4 accidents on which this risk ratio was determined.
Note that although this sample was limited the risk ratio was statistically significant at the 0.05
level.
Separate calculations for the number of take-offs and landings on snow and ice covered runways
were not made. Such operations are rare compared to the operations on wet runways. Since the
accident sample contains 12 accidents on snow/ice covered runways, the associated risk would
be much higher than the risk ratio’s presented in Table 7.
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6 Conclusions and recommendations
6.1 Conclusions
• Based on a sample of European airports there appears to be a four-fold increase in the
accident risk for aircraft operating on wet and contaminated runways.
 
• There is no significant difference in the accident risk among jet and turboprop aircraft.
 
• After many years of research on runway surface condition and the awareness of the impact
of it on safety margins, operations on wet and contaminated runways are still associated
with a higher accident probability.
 
• There appears to be no significant difference in accident risk during take-off and landing on
wet and contaminated runways.
6.2 Recommendations
• Pilots should be aware that whenever a touchdown far down the wet or contaminated
runway is likely, a go-around should be considered.
 
• The risk value of aircraft operations on wet and contaminated runways should be conveyed
to all operators and airport authorities.
 
• Crosswind capabilities on wet and contaminated runways should be considered in
Airworthiness documents like JAR and FAR.
 
• Deficiencies in the current version of AMJ 25X1591 should be removed as soon as
possible.
 
• Research into hydroplaning of radial tires and precipitation drag of snow should be started.
 
• The risk quantification of operations on wet and contaminated runways should be conducted
for other regions like North America.
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Table 1: Typical take-off, landing and hydroplaning speeds of commercial jet and turboprop
aircraft.
Aircraft
type
Standard tire
pressure of main
gear †
psi
Typical
 rotation speed
kts
Take-off
hydroplaning
speed
kts
9√p
Typical
touchdown
speed
 kts
Landing
hydroplaning
speed
kts
7.7√p
A300 196 145 126 136 108
A310 180 137 121 138 103
A320 175 128 119 135 102
A330 190 146 124 137 106
A340 186 146 123 142 105
BAe 146 133 119 104 117 89
B727 167 158 116 137 100
B737 175 137 119 133 102
B747 200 176 127 153 109
B757 170 146 117 132 100
B767 190 135 124 136 106
B777 190 150 124 138 106
DC-10 170 175 117 147 100
MD-11 205 168 129 148 110
MD-87 184 134 122 133 104
F28 101 127 90 125 77
F100 142 131 107 130 92
IL-62 157 138 113 129 96
TU-154 135 131 105 121 89
ATR 42 109 101 94 106 80
ATR 72 114 107 96 113 82
BAe ATP 86 106 83 103 71
BAe 748 86 102 83 95 71
DASH 7 107 80 93 84 80
DASH 8 131 91 103 100 88
Do-228 75 76 78 85 67
F50 82 97 81 99 70
Saab 340 115 105 97 110 83
Saab 2000 165 124 116 125 99
† Source: Jeppesen Sanderson 1995.
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Table 2: List of countries considered for the presented study with their average annual number
of operations on wet and contaminated runways.
Country Average annual number of take-offs
and landings on wet and
contaminated runways
(percentage of total)
Austria 24%
Belgium 22%
Denmark 19%
Finland 21%
France 14%
Germany* 23%
Greece 5%
Ireland 29%
Italy 11%
Luxembourg 20%
Netherlands 20%
Norway 26%
Poland 19%
Portugal 9%
Spain 6%
Sweden 19%
Switzerland 20%
Turkey 12%
United Kingdom 20%
*East-Germany included.
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Table 3: Accident distribution by flight phase and runway condition.
Flight phase Runway condition No. %
LANDING DRY 33 36.3
LANDING SNOW/ICE 7 7.7
LANDING WATER/SLUSH 4 4.4
LANDING WET 24 26.4
TAKE-OFF DRY 13 14.3
TAKE-OFF SNOW/ICE 5 5.5
TAKE-OFF WATER/SLUSH 1 1.1
TAKE-OFF WET 4 4.4
Table 4: Damage to the aircraft in the sample.
Damage No. %
DESTROYED 14 15.4
SUBSTANTIAL 34 37.4
MINOR 42 46.2
UNKNOWN 1 1.1
Table 5: Distribution RTO accidents.
RTO AFTER V1? No. %
YES 9 39.1
UNKNOWN 3 13.0
NO 11 47.8
Table 6: Hydroplaning on wet and water/slush covered runways.
Hydroplaning? No. %
YES 8 24.2
UNKNOWN 16 48.5
NO 9 27.3
Table 7: Risk Ratio for several combinations of aircraft type and flight phase.
Flight phase Jet & Turboprop
aircraft
Jet aircraft Turboprop aircraft
Take-off & Landing 4.1 4.1 3.9
Take-off 3.2 2.5 10.8
Landing 4.4 4.9 3.2
All Risk Ratios are significant at the 0.05 level.
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Figure 1: B-737 Tire-to-ground braking performance for different runway conditions.
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Figure 2: Contamination drag versus ground speed of a BAC 1-11 aircraft.
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Figure 3: Snow contamination drag versus ground speed for a B-737 aircraft.
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Figure 4: Experimental hydroplaning speeds versus tire pressure on water covered runways.
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Figure 5: Touchdown and hydroplaning speeds versus main gear tire pressure.
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Figure 6: Rotation and hydroplaning speeds versus main gear tire pressure.
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Figure 7: Tire side force coefficient as functions of tire yaw angle and surface conditions.
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Figure 8: Maximum crosswind versus braking friction for an F-28 aircraft (from Ref. 15).
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Figure 9: Calculated and measured main gear precipitation drag of a Citation II in a pond (from
Ref. 7).
